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GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

14 August 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Indication Center

SUBJECT : MRSC Intelligence Requirements
(IAC D-122, 18 June 1958)

REFERENCE : Your memorandum, same subject, dated 11 August 1958

1. I appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the attachment to referenced memorandum.

2. Generally you state your case in an excellent manner. I do feel however, that I must take issue with several general hypotheses you have made, and also with some basic data included which I feel is inaccurate.

3. I cannot visualize a situation, even so far off as 1962, wherein a Soviet attack would occur relying entirely on missiles. Should such an attack be contemplated by the USSR, it is inconceivable to me that all Soviet offensive and defensive assets would not be marshalled. Certainly, the Soviet long range air force would be activated as would ground forces and defensive units be readied to capitalize on any offensive strike and to prepare for possible US retaliation. Consequently, I feel your presentation should place missiles in their proper perspective as effective weapons systems to be used in concert with other systems in an all-out Soviet offensive. Perhaps these thoughts could best be set out in the introductory paragraph.

4. The latest NIE on missiles does not give any indications of numbers except for the ICBM for which the numbers given reflect only a capability and should not be used to indicate a stockpile. The new estimate has some wide variances with missile systems previously estimated. This would preclude the use of numbers from

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the earlier estimate for any manner of illustration. I realize that this creates some problems in your presentation, but in this instance I feel that it would be far safer to omit numbers than to relate erroneous information. The new estimate of numbers of missiles ^{would} be initiated in a few weeks.

5. In paragraph 2, even with intermediate range missiles deployed in the satellites, the range is not sufficient to reach Morocco SAC bases. In paragraph 3, the parenthetical phrase regarding solid propellants should also include "storable liquid propellants".

6. In the last paragraph, it would help to emphasize that in the case of the long range air force there would be forward deployment prior to an impending attack in contrast with missiles which would not require this deployment.

/s/

EARL McFARLAND, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Chairman, GMIC

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